Leontine C. Pond and Merle G. Hyer Company, a Utah Corporation, holders of Preferred Stock in Insurance Investment Company, a Utah Corporation, on behalf of themselves and other simliarly situated holders of such stock v. Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company, a Utah Corporation, Insurance Investment Company, a Utah Corporation, R. Earl Ross, E Roderick Ross, Galen J. Ross, David E. Ross IIC, Diane Ross Worthen, betsy Ross Rapps, Connie Ross, and Does 1 through 20: Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1992
Leontine C. Pond and Merle G. Hyer Company, a
Utah Corporation, holders of Preferred Stock in
Insurance Investment Company, a Utah
Corporation, on behalf of themselves and other
simliarly situated holders of such stock v. Equitable
Life and Casualty Insurance Company, a Utah
Corporation, Insurance Investment Company, a
Utah Corporation, R. Earl Ross, E Roderick Ross,
Galen J. Ross, David E. Ross IIC, Diane Ross
Worthen, betsy Ross Rapps, Connie Ross, and
Does 1 through 20: Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jay B. Bell; P. Bruce Badger; Attorneys for Appellees.
Lynn P. Heward; Delwin T. Pond; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Pond v. Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance, No. 920759 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1992).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/4750
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.A 
'-ao. ^7Jf\S*[ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LEONTINE C. POND and MERLE G. HYER 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
holders of Preferred Stock in 
Insurance Investment Company, a 
Utah corporation, on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly 
situated holders of such stock, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion; INSURANCE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; R. EARL ROSS; 
E. RODERICK ROSS; GALEN J. ROSS; 
DAVID E. ROSS II; DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN; BETSY ROSS RAPPS; CONNIE 
ROSS; and DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
Appeal No. 920759-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Civil No. 890905755CV 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya p£p 2 4 1933 
Lynn P. Heward 
Delwin T. Pond 
923 East 5350 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 264-804 0 
Attorneys for Appellants 
$ > s * ^ c ^ _ Jay B. Bell 
P. Bruce Baayc, , M T -
FABIAN Sc CLENDENINQIerk of the Court 
a Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Company, Insurance 
Investment Company, R. Earl 
Ross, E. Roderick Ross 
3:\pbb\2691 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
LEONTINE C. POND and MERLE G. HYER 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
holders of Preferred Stock in 
Insurance Investment Company, a 
Utah corporation, on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly 
situated holders of such stock, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion; INSURANCE INVESTMENT COMPANY, 
a Utah corporation; R. EARL ROSS; 
E. RODERICK ROSS; GALEN J. ROSS; 
DAVID E. ROSS II; DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN; BETSY ROSS RAPPS; CONNIE 
ROSS; and DOES 1 through 20, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
APPELLEES' BRIEF 
Appeal from the Third District Court, Salt Lake County 
Civil No. 890905755CV 
The Honorable James S. Sawaya 
Jay B. Bell 
P. Bruce Badger 
FABIAN 8c CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Twelfth Floor 
215 South State Street 
P.O. Box 510210 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151 
Telephone: (801) 531-8900 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Company, Insurance 
Investment Company, R. Earl 
Ross, E. Roderick Ross 
s:\pbb\2691 
Appeal No. 920759-CA 
Argument Priority 15 
Lynn P. Heward 
Delwin T. Pond 
923 East 5350 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Telephone: (801) 264-8040 
Attorneys for Appellants 
GEORGE D. MEIUNG, JR 
WARREN PATTEN 
M BYRON FISHER 
STANFORD B. OWEN 
WILLIAM H. ADAMS 
ANTHONY L. RAMPTON 
PETER W. BILLINGS, JR. 
THOMAS CHRISTENSEN, JR. 
DENISE A. DRAGOO 
JAY B. BELL 
DANIEL W. ANDERSON 
GARY E. JUBBER 
ROSEMARY J. BELESS 
ANNA W. DRAKE 
W. CULLEN BATTLE 
KEVIN N. ANDERSON 
RANDY K. JOHNSON 
NORMAN J. YOUNKER 
MICHELE MITCHELL 
JOHN E. S. ROBSON 
DOUGLAS B CANNON 
DOUGLAS J. PAYNE 
ROBERT PALMER REES 
DIANE H. BANKS 
P BRUCE BADGER 
JOHN (JACK) D. RAY 
KATHLEEN H. SWITZER 
CRAIG T JACOBSEN 
BRUCE D. REEMSNYDER 
BROCK R. BELNAP 
DOUGLAS R. BREWER 
CRAIG E. HUGHES 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
ATTORNEYS AT LAW 
TWELFTH FLOOR 
215 SOUTH STATE STREET 
P.O. BOX 510210 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84151 
TELEPHONE (801) 531-8900 
FACSIMILE (801) 596-2814 
March 30 , 1993 FILED 
OF COUNSEL 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
RALPH H. MILLER 
HELEN J. EDWARDS 
NEVADA OFFICE 
KEVIN N. ANDERSON 
2835 SOUTH JONES BLVD., SUITE 5 
LAS VEGAS, NEVADA 89102 
TELEPHONE (702) 367-4545 
(702) 252-5014 
Ms. Mary T. Noonan, Clerk 
Utah Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
MAR 311993 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Re: Leontine C. Pond, et al. vs. 
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance 
Co., et al. 
Appeal No. 920759-CA 
Dear Ms. Noonan: 
I represent the appellees in the above-entitled appeal 
On their behalf, I am submitting this letter to you, with seven 
copies, pursuant to Rule 24 (j) of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure (Citation of Supplemental Authorities). 
The recent written opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals 
in Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company vs. David E. Ross, 
11i Appeal No. 910746-CA, filed March 10, 1993 (attached), is 
pertinent to the argument made at pp. 29-33 of Appellee's Brief 
filed on February 24, 1993. 
Sincerely, 
PBB:csw 
cc: Lynn P. Heward, Esq. 
Delwin T. Pond, Esq. 
This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
00O00 
FILED 
Utah Court of Appeals 
MAR 1 0 1993 
/ • MaryT.Noonan 
' Clerk of thArvv,* 
Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Co., a Utah 
corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
David E. Ross II, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
Clerk of the Court 
OPINION 
(For P u b l i c a t i o n ) 
Case No. 910746-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 10, 1993) 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat 
Attorneys: Mark A. Larsen, Salt Lake City, for Appellant 
Warren Patten, P. Bruce Badger, and Bruce D. 
Reemsnyder, Salt Lake City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Bench, Garff, and Russon. 
RUSSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
David E. Ross II appeals the trial court's orders awarding 
summary judgment and attorney fees to Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Co. (Equitable). We affirm. 
FACTS 
On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, we review 
the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. 
Allen v. Prudential Property and Casualty Ins. Co., 839 P.2d 798, 
799 (Utah 1992). 
In 1986, Bennett Leasing Company (Bennett) attempted a 
hostile takeover of Equitable by attempting to purchase the stock 
of David E. Ross II, his wife Connie Ross, his sister Betsy Ross 
Rapps, and his uncle Galen Ross (collectively, the selling 
group). R. Earl Ross, Equitable's chief executive officer, and 
E. Roderick Ross, Equitable's president, opposed the attempted 
purchase by Bennett. The dispute was resolved when the selling 
group agreed to sell their stock to Equitable in exchange for 
cash and Equitable preferred stock convertible to cash. 
After considerable negotiation over several months, 
Equitable sent an offer to the selling group by letter dated 
September 25, 1987. That offer provided for an increase in the 
purchase price of the stock and added: 
This increase in purchase price is being made 
hand in hand with the acceptance of the 
agreement as enclosed. Any changes made with 
the agreement will result in the decrease of 
the proposed purchase price. In other words, 
a premium is being paid to eliminate argument 
over the minute terms of the agreement. 
The selling group did not accept the agreement as enclosed, but 
instead prepared, signed, and sent its own offer to Equitable on 
October 30, 1987. Equitable signed the agreement on November 4, 
and sent it back to the selling group, with a letter clarifying a 
few points, which letter was approved by the selling group. The 
final contract documents consisted of the agreement, an addendum, 
an escrow agreement, and the letter of clarification. 
However, at closing on December 2, 1987, David E. Ross II 
asserted that an agreement for him to perform consulting services 
for Equitable, which had been included in earlier drafts of the 
agreement, should have been included in the final contract 
documents, but was not. Equitable responded that no such 
agreement was to be included, to which Ross replied that without 
same there would be no contract. An impasse was avoided when the 
parties agreed to "close around the issue" of the consulting 
agreement, and both Ross and Equitable added handwritten 
statements to the agreement. Ross wrote: 
[B]y signing this instrument I do not waive 
any right or claim to pursue the Consulting 
Agreement pursuant to the agreement between 
the parties. Not given for any acceptance of 
any funds. In addition, acceptance of any 
funds pursuant to the agreement shall not be 
construed as a waiver of any kind. 
Equitable added: 
By following this directive, Equitable Life 
and Casualty Insurance Company does not admit 
or imply that there exists any "Consulting 
Agreement" or understanding regarding any 
consulting agreement. In addition, Equitable 
Life and Casualty Insurance Company takes the 
position that receipt of funds and 
participation herein by David E. Ross is a 
waiver of rights, if any exist, by David E. 
Ross. Acceptance of the cash down payment by 
Daniel Jackson, esquire trustee account, is 
not a waiver of rights by David E. Ross. 
The stock certificates were subsequently delivered to Equitable. 
However, when the time came for David E. Ross II to endorse 
the stock certificates, he refused to do so, claiming a right to 
rescind the agreement. In response, Equitable filed a complaint 
for specific performance of the agreement. Ross counterclaimed 
for rescission of the agreement, alleging mutual and unilateral 
mistake and seeking damages for breach of contract and fraud. 
Equitable filed a motion for partial summary judgment enforcing 
the agreement and thereby dismissing Ross's counterclaim for 
rescission, which motion was granted. 
The matter then proceeded to trial to the bench on David E. 
Ross II's remaining claim of damages against Equitable for breach 
of contract. Following Ross's opening statement, Equitable moved 
for dismissal of the case. The Court, treating the motion as a 
motion for summary judgment, considered the depositions and 
exhibits marked by the parties for trial, and granted Equitable's 
motion. Equitable subsequently requested and received attorney 
fees and costs. 
David E. Ross II appeals, raising the following issues: 
(1) Were there sufficient material facts to establish his right 
to rescission under a theory of unilateral mistake, and if so, 
did he relinquish that right?; (2) Were there sufficient material 
facts to establish a breach of contract action, entitling him to 
either rescission or damages?; and (3) Were attorney fees 
properly awarded to Equitable under the contract and, if so, were 
such fees reasonable? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Summary judgment is only proper "when there is no genuine 
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law." Baldwin v. Burton, No. 900339, 
slip op. at 4 (Utah February 19, 1993) (footnote omitted); see 
Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). "On an appeal from a summary judgment, we 
construe the evidentiary material submitted on the motion and all 
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion." Thurston v. Box 
Elder County, 835 P.2d 165, 166 (Utah 1992) (citations omitted). 
"We review the district court's legal conclusions for 
correctness.11 Id. (citation omitted). 
UNILATERAL MISTAKE 
David E. Ross II argues that the trial court erred in 
granting Equitable's pre-trial motion for summary judgment 
because there were sufficient material facts to establish his 
right to rescission under a theory of unilateral mistake. 
Equitable responds that the trial court properly granted summary 
judgment because Ross cannot establish his right to rescission on 
the basis of unilateral mistake under any set of facts. We 
agree. 
In Klas v. Van Wagoner. 829 P.2d 135 (Utah App. 1992), we 
outlined the four criteria that must be satisfied before 
rescission based on unilateral mistake will be granted: 
1. The mistake must be of so grave a 
consequence that to enforce the contract as 
actually made would be unconscionable. 
2. The matter as to which the mistake was 
made must relate to a material feature of the 
contract. 
3. Generally the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary 
diligence by the party making the mistake. 
4. It must be possible to give relief by way 
of rescission without serious prejudice to 
the other party except the loss of his 
bargain. In other words, it must be possible 
to put him in status quo. 
Id. at 138-39 (quoting Grahn v. Gregory, 800 P.2d 320, 327 (Utah 
App. 1990), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 (Utah 1991)). 
As to the first criterion, there are two kinds of 
unconscionability: procedural and substantive. Id. at 139. 
Procedural unconscionability centers on the "relative positions 
of the parties and the circumstances surrounding the execution of 
the contract," Jones v. Johnson, 761 P.2d 37, 39 (Utah App. 1988) 
(quoting Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d 455, 461 (Utah 
1983)), and occurs "where there is an absence of meaningful 
choice and where lack of education or sophistication results in 
no opportunity to understand the terms of the agreement." Id. 
(citing Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock 
Co., 706 P.2d 1028, 1042 (Utah 1985)). "Substantive 
unconscionability occurs when contract terms are xso lopsided as 
to unfairly oppress or surprise an innocent party,' or where 
there is xan overall imbalance in rights and responsibilities 
imposed by the contract, excessive price or a significant cost-
price disparity, or terms which are inconsistent with accepted 
mores of commercial practice,/M Klas. 829 P.2d at 139 (quoting 
Jones, 761 P.2d at 40). 
Applying the foregoing to the facts of this case, we are not 
convinced that the alleged mistake was so grave as to make 
enforcement of the contract unconscionable. First, as to 
procedural unconscionability, there is no indication in the facts 
that the relative positions of the parties resulted in unequal 
bargaining positions. To the contrary, the facts show that the 
parties continually negotiated from equal positions. Nor do the 
facts indicate that there was an absence of meaningful choice on 
David E. ftoss II's behalf, or that he suffered any lack of 
education or sophistication that resulted in an inability to 
understand the terms of the agreement. Instead,, the facts show 
that the parties engaged in many highly sophisticated 
negotiations, in which numerous substantive changes were made to 
the agreement. Thus, there was no procedural unconscionability. 
Nor was there substantive unconscionability. Utah appellate 
courts have consistently held that: 
sellers and buyers should be able to contract 
on their own terms without the indulgence of 
paternalism by the courts in the alleviation 
of one side or another from the effects of a 
poor bargain. They should be permitted to 
enter into contracts that may actually be 
unreasonable or which may lead to hardship on 
one side. 
Park Valley Corp. v. Baqlev, 635 P.2d 65, 67 (Utah 1981) 
(citation omitted); accord Klas, 829 P.2d at 139-40. This is 
especially true when the parties are dealing at arms length. 
Park Valley Corp.. 635 P.2d at 67. 
In the case at bar, extensive negotiations took place in 
which numerous items were added to and deleted from the 
agreement. Given the parties' equal bargaining positions, it is 
clear that the contract terms were not so lopsided as to unfairly 
oppress or surprise Ross, nor was there was an overall imbalance 
in rights and responsibilities imposed by the contract. We 
therefore conclude that enforcement of the contract in this case 
is not unconscionable. 
Additionally, as to the third criterion, David E. Ross II 
has not shown that the mistake occurred notwithstanding the 
exercise of ordinary diligence by him. On October 30, 1987, the 
selling group, of which Ross was a member, prepared, signed, and 
sent a contract to Equitable. Equitable then signed the contract 
and sent it back to the selling group, along with a letter 
clarifying a few points. It was up to Ross at that point to 
exercise ordinary diligence in examining the agreement prior to 
the selling group's acceptance. However, he did not raise the 
issue of the consulting agreement at that time, but waited until 
closing on December 2, 1987, at which time he agreed to "close 
around the issue" of the consulting agreement. Thus, even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ross, if 
there was any mistake on the part of Ross, it was entirely due to 
his own negligence in not discovering and correcting what he 
regarded to be an error in the parties' agreement. Under such 
circumstances, we cannot say that "the mistake must have occurred 
notwithstanding the exercise of ordinary diligence by the party 
making the mistake." Klas, 829 P.2d at 138-39 (quoting Grahn, 
800 P.2d at 327); see generally John Call Engineering, Inc. v. 
Manti City Corp.. 743 P.2d 1205, 1210 (Utah 1987) (party seeking 
rescission on the basis of unilateral mistake must establish that 
error occurred despite that party's exercise of due care); Davis 
v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834, 835 (1970) (party is 
not entitled to rescission if mistake occurred as a result of 
that party's own negligence). 
Accordingly, because David E. Ross II did not fulfill two of 
the four criteria necessary to justify rescission on the basis of 
unilateral mistake, the trial court did not err in granting 
Equitable's pre-trial motion for summary judgment on that claim. 
BREACH OF CONTRACT 
David E. Ross II appeals the trial court's order granting 
Equitable's second motion for summary judgment, alleging that the 
agreement between the parties was ambiguous and that sufficient 
material facts existed to establish a breach of contract action, 
entitling him to either rescission or damages. Equitable 
responds that the contract was unambiguous and did not provide 
for a consulting agreement for Ross. Thus, Equitable argues, the 
trial court properly granted its motion. 
"Questions of contract interpretation not requiring resort 
to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such questions 
we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of 
correctness." Zions First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. 
Co., 749 P.2d 651, 653 (Utah 1988). Furthermore, whether a 
contract is ambiguous is itself a question of law. Village Inn 
Apartments v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co,. 790 P.2d 581, 582 
(Utah App. 1990) (citing Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 
1293 (Utah 1983); Property Assistance Corp. v. Roberts. 768 P.2d 
976, 977 (Utah App. 1989)). "Contract language may be ambiguous 
if it is unclear, omits terms, or if the terms used to express 
the intention of the parties may be understood to have two or 
more plausible meanings." Id. at 583 (citations omitted). 
However, a contract term is not ambiguous simply because one 
party ascribes a different meaning to it to suit his or her own 
interests. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 818 P.2d 1316, 
1319 (Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted), cert, denied. 827 P.2d 
47 6 (Utah 1992). Moreover, if we determine that the contract 
terms are clear and unambiguous, "we interpret them according to 
their plain and ordinary meaning and extrinsic or parol evidence 
is generally not admissible to explain the intent of the 
parties." Id. (citing Faulkner, 665 P.2d at 1293; Valley Bank & 
Trust Co. v. U.S. Life Title Ins. Co.. 776 P.2d 933, 936 (Utah 
App. 1989J) . 
As an initial matter, we address David E. Ross II's argument 
that the selling group accepted Equitable's September 25, 1987 
offer, and that since that offer contained a provision that a 
consulting fee of $200,000 to be paid to David E. Ross II for 
being Equitable's legal advisor for five years, such provision 
should be read into the agreement between the parties. Even 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Ross, such an 
argument is untenable. 
Although Equitable's September 25 offer did provide for a 
consulting fee to be paid to Ross, that offer also provided that 
the agreement must either be accepted as a whole or rejected: 
This increase in purchase price is being made 
hand in hand with the acceptance of the 
agreement as enclosed. Any changes made with 
the agreement will result in the decrease of 
the proposed purchase price. In other words, 
a premium is being paid to eliminate argument 
over the minute terms of the agreement. 
When an offer specifies the manner in which it must be 
accepted, it can only be accepted in the specified manner. 
Otherwise mutual assent is lacking, and no contract is formed. 
Crane v. Timberbrook Village. Ltd.. 774 P.2d 3, 4 (Utah App. 
1989); see generally Burton v. Coombs. 557 P.2d 148, 148-49 (Utah 
1976). Thus, the selling group's October 30, 1987 offer, which 
changed numerous provisions of Equitable's September 25 offer,1 
must be viewed as a rejection of and counter-offer to Equitable's 
September 25 offer. Accordingly, the selling groups October 30 
offer and the addendum, escrow agreement, and Equitable's 
November 4, 1987 letter of clarification constitute the agreement 
in question in this case, and we examine those documents for 
ambiguity. 
In doing so, we conclude that the agreement between the 
parties is clear and unambiguous. Although some of the extrinsic 
evidence presented to the trial court indicates that earlier 
drafts of the contract included a provision for a consulting 
agreement for David E. Ross II, resort to that extrinsic evidence 
is not required in this case, since such provision is simply not 
included in the final draft. The final contract, which was 
drafted by the selling group, makes no reference to a consulting 
agreement, and this was the offer which was accepted by Equitable 
on November 4, 1987, and eventually became the agreement between 
the parties. Given the fact that the selling group, of which 
David E. Ross II was a member, drafted this offer, which did not 
include a consulting agreement, it would be grossly inequitable 
at this point for this court to now go back and insert a 
consulting agreement into the parties' agreement. Accordingly, 
we decline to do so. 
Furthermore, the only reference to a consulting agreement 
whatsoever is contained in the addendum to the agreement, and 
this reference plainly fails to establish the existence of such 
an agreement. That provision simply provides, in pertinent part: 
2. Offset. The redemption, or purchase 
price of the Equitable Preferred Stock owned 
or attributed to the Selling Group and 
redeemed or purchased by Equitable shall be 
offset and decreased by the amount of federal 
taxes, interest and penalties, incurred and 
paid by Equitable as a result of an audit or 
audits in which Equitable's income tax 
obligation is increased from adjustments made 
as a result of the deduction as an ordinary 
and reasonable expense of any of the 
1. These changes included an increase in the down payment to the 
selling group, a decrease in the preferred Equitable stock, the 
addition of a payment of $100,000 to David E. Ross II at closing, 
an adjustment in the price at which the selling group could 
redeem their preferred Equitable shares, and an increase in the 
deferred payment to the selling group, as well as several other 
changes. 
following being partially or totally 
disallowed; 
(a) Consulting payments to David; 
(b) Payment of $300,000 to Bennett 
Leasing Company; 
(c) Settlement of lawsuits with 
David E. Ross II; 
(d) Payment of $250,000 to First 
National Bank of New Jersey. 
This provision does not establish the existence of a 
consulting agreement, nor of any of the other provisions listed, 
but only indicates that if payments are made, the total payment 
should be* offset by the payment of taxes, interest and penalties 
incurred and paid by Equitable if those fees are paid, deducted 
for tax purposes, and then disallowed as tax deductions.2 
Nor does the fact that David E. Ross II added the following 
handwritten language to the addendum to the contract alter our 
analysis: 
[B]y signing this instrument I do not waive 
any right or claim to pursue the Consulting 
Agreement pursuant to the agreement between 
the parties. Not given for any acceptance of 
any funds. In addition, acceptance of any 
funds pursuant to the agreement shall not be 
construed as a waiver of any kind. 
2. Moreover, even were we to find the addendum establishes the 
existence of a consulting agreement, Ross's claim nevertheless 
fails. The only mention of a consulting agreement in any of the 
documents which constitute-the parties' agreement is this passing 
reference in the addendum. There is no specification in any of 
the documents of the scope, the terms, or the value of the 
consulting agreement. Thus, even if inclusion of such agreement 
was at one time considered by the parties, clearly there was no 
"meeting of the minds" as to that issue, as the trial court 
correctly found to be the case here. Since there was no "meeting 
of the minds" as to the consulting agreement, it cannot be 
considered part of the parties' agreement. See Cottonwood Mall 
Co. v. Sine. 767 P.2d 499, 502 (Utah 1988); John Call 
Engineering, Inc. v. Manti City Corp., 743 P.2d 1205, 1207 (Utah 
1987); Herm Hughes & Sons. Inc. v. Ouintek. 834 P.2d 582, 584 
(Utah App. 1992). 
All this provision indicates is that Ross retained his right to 
pursue the consulting agreement that was included in earlier 
drafts of the contract between the parties. There is no 
reservation, explicit or implicit, of a right to rescind the 
agreement entered into, only to pursue a separate right to a 
consulting agreement.3 However, it is far too great a leap to 
read the language in guestion as indicating that by reserving a 
right to pursue a consulting agreement, Ross also reserved a 
right to totally rescind the agreement between the parties. We 
therefore decline to do so. 
Since the agreement between Equitable and the selling group 
unambiguously did not provide for a consulting agreement, the 
trial court did not err in granting Equitable's second motion for 
summary judgment on David E. Ross's remaining claim of damages.4 
ATTORNEY FEES 
David E. Ross II appeals the trial court's award of attorney 
fees to Equitable, claiming that although Equitable is entitled 
to an award of attorney fees with regard to its claim for breach 
of contract, it is not entitled to those fees incurred in 
defending against Ross's claim for rescission. Equitable 
responds that since the contract between the parties provided for 
such fees, and since the two issues are, in essence, the same 
issue, the trial court properly awarded it attorney fees. 
In Utah, attorney fees are awarded only if authorized by 
statute or contract. Dixie State Bank v. Bracken. 764 P.2d 985, 
988 (Utah 1988); accord Cottonwood Mall Co. v. Sine, 830 P.2d 
266, 269 (Utah 1992). If provided for by contract, attorney fees 
are awarded in accordance with the terms of that contract. Dixie 
State Bank, 764 P.2d at 988. Although such an award is a matter 
of legal right, it must be reasonable and supported by adequate 
3. Additionally, we note that our decision in this matter in no 
way forecloses Ross's right to pursue that claim. 
4. Moreover, even were we to find that the agreement between the 
parties was ambiguous, we would nonetheless have to rule against 
Ross, given the well-settled rule that ambiguous contracts must 
be construed against the drafter. See, e.g., Sears v. Riemersma, 
655 P.2d 1105, 1107 (Utah 1982) ("The well-established rule in 
Utah is that any uncertainty with respect to construction of a 
contract should be resolved against the party who had drawn the 
agreement.M); Parks Enters., Inc. v. New Century Realty, Inc., 
652 P.2d 918, 920 (Utah 1982) ("It is also settled law that a 
contract will be construed against the drafter."). 
evidence, Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 213, 219 (Utah App. 1990). 
Determination of such fees is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, and will not be overturned unless there is a showing 
of a clear abuse of discretion. Dixie State Bank, 764 P.2d at 
989, Furthermore, we "will presume that the discretion of the 
trial court was properly exercised unless the record clearly 
shows to the contrary." Goddard v. Hickman. 685 P.2d 530, 534-35 
(Utah 1984) (quoting State ex rel. Road Comm'n v. General Oil 
Co.. 22 Utah 2d 60, 62, 448 P.2d 718, 719 (1968)). 
In the case at bar, the parties' contract provides: 
In the event any party hereto alleges a 
breach or violation of the terms and 
conditions of this Agreement by another 
party, the prevailing party to such resulting 
action shall have a right to recover from the 
'non-prevailing party any and all costs and 
expenses, including reasonable attorneys' 
fees, incurred in the defense or pursuit of 
said action. 
The plain language of the contract provides that the 
prevailing party has a right to an award of attorney fees 
incurred in the pursuit or defense of an action arising from a 
claimed violation of the contract. Since Equitable incurred fees 
both in pursuing its claim for breach of contract and in 
defending against David E. Ross II's claim for rescission, it is 
clearly entitled to an award of attorney fees in regard to both 
actions. Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 
awarding attorney fees in accordance with the terms of the 
parties' contract. 
Ross also argues that the trial court abused its discretion 
in determining that Equitable's requested attorney fees were 
reasonable. As to the reasonableness of the attorney fees 
awarded by the trial court, determination of such fees is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court, so long as the fees are 
supported by the evidence in the record. Baldwin v. Burton, No. 
900339, slip op. at 17 (Utah February 19, 1993) (footnotes 
omitted). Among the factors to be considered by the trial court 
in considering the reasonableness of the fee are "the extent of 
services rendered, the difficulty of the issues involved, the 
reasonableness of time spent on the case, fees charged in the 
locality for similar services, and the necessity of bringing an 
action to vindicate rights." Id. at 17-18 (footnote omitted). 
In the case at bar, the trial court's determination is amply 
supported by the evidence and appears to be reasonable, 
especially in light of the fact that Equitable filed an attorney 
fees affidavit with detailed billing statements attached, which 
strictly complied with Rule 4-505 of the Utah Code of Judicial 
Administration. Since the record supports the trial court's 
award of attorney fees in this case, we cannot say that the trial 
court committed a clear abuse of discretion in determining that 
the said fees were reasonable.5 
CONCLUSION 
For the aforementioned reasons, we conclude that the trial 
court did not err in granting Equitable's motions for summary 
judgment, and did not abuse its discretion in awarding Equitable 
attorney fees under the contract. Accordingly, we affirm. 
Leonard H. Russon, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
&4$UL M, H^cJL 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
5. This is particularly true considering the fact that the basis 
of Ross's opposition to the reasonableness of the award of 
attorney fees, that Equitable should have filed another motion 
for summary judgment as to Ross's remaining claims instead of 
going to trial, is, as noted by the trial court, a somewhat 
disingenuous position for a party bringing a claim in good faith 
to take. 
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I. JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
II. STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
At the trial court level Judge Sawaya entered five 
rulings against plaintiffs.1 Although plaintiffs' Notice of 
Appeal states that they intend to appeal each of these rulings, 
their statement of the issues, standard of review, and argument 
do not fairly focus on the nature of each trial court ruling. 
A. CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION 
In the trial court's first ruling against the 
plaintiffs, Judge Sawaya denied plaintiffs' request to certify 
this case as a class action. Judge Sawaya first denied the 
request without oral argument. Order, R. 084. Plaintiffs 
renewed their Motion and requested an opportunity to more fully 
brief the case law. Motion, R. 142. Judge Sawaya granted the 
request and allowed plaintiffs to file an exhaustive Memorandum 
of Points and Authorities, R. 103, and to make oral argument. He 
1
 Plaintiffs/Appellants will be referred to throughout 
this brief as plaintiffs. Defendants/Appellees will be referred 
to throughout as defendants. The term "defendants" refers 
collectively, unless otherwise designated, to Equitable Life and 
Casualty Insurance Company, Insurance Investment Company, R. Earl 
Ross, and E. Roderick Ross. 
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then denied class action certification a second time. Order, 
R. 218. 
Judge Sawaya's decision on class action status can only 
be reversed when it is shown that the trial court misapplied the 
law or abused its discretion. Call v. City of West Jordan, 727 
P.2d 180 (Utah 1986). 
B. SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTIONS 
1. First Summary Judgment Motion 
In the trial court's second ruling against plaintiffs, 
Judge Sawaya granted defendants' motion for partial summary 
judgment on plaintiffs' claim that a partial liquidation of 
Insurance Investment Company ("IIC") had occurred which would 
entitle plaintiffs as IIC preferred shareholders to distribution 
rights under the corporation's Articles of Incorporation. Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment, R. 269; Minute Entry giving reason 
for granting Motion, R. 310; Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment, R. 317. 
In reviewing this award of partial summary judgment, 
this Court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable 
to plaintiffs to determine whether there is a genuine dispute as 
to any material fact, or whether, even according to the facts as 
plaintiffs contend, defendants are entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. D & L Supply v. Saurini, 775 P.2d 420 (Utah 1989) 
(quoting Themv v. Seagull Enter., Inc., 595 P.2d 526 (Utah 1975). 
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In considering whether there is a genuine dispute as to 
any material fact, this Court should be aware that virtually 
every material fact laid out by defendants in their two Motions 
for Summary Judgment went unchallenged and undisputed. 
Plaintiffs now attempt, in their brief to this court, to frame 
issues that by their nature dispute formerly unchallenged facts. 
Thus, plaintiffs do not properly focus on the proper standard of 
appellate review of summary judgments. 
In deciding whether the trial court properly granted 
summary judgment as a matter of law, this Court must give no 
deference to the trial court's view of the law, but should review 
it for correctness. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving, Inc. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989). 
2. Second Summary Judgment Motion 
In the trial court's third ruling against plaintiffs, 
Judge Sawaya granted defendants' second Motion for Summary 
Judgment that disposed of plaintiffs' remaining claim for breach 
of fiduciary duty. Summary Judgment Motion, R. 3 90; Order and 
Summary Judgment, R. 596. Once again, the facts were undisputed. 
See Defendants Reply Memorandum, R. 557 at 2. The standard of 
review is the same as for all summary judgment motions. 
C. MOTIONS TO AMEND COMPLAINT AND JOIN ADDITIONAL 
PLAINTIFFS 
In the fourth and fifth rulings against plaintiffs, the 
trial court denied plaintiffs' Motion to Allow Amended Complaint, 
s \pbb\2691 ~3 -
R. 525, and plaintiffs' Motion to Intervene. R. 493. Plaintiffs 
filed these motions in an apparent response to defendants' second 
Motion for Summary Judgment. Defendants did not oppose the 
Motion to Intervene; however, Judge Sawaya denied both the 
motions to amend and to intervene several weeks after he had 
granted defendants' second summary judgment motion. Order, R. 
603, Order, R. 608. Judge Sawaya's decision to deny plaintiffs' 
motions to amend and to intervene were matters that were within 
the broad discretion of the court and should not be disturbed-
absent an abuse of discretion resulting in prejudice. Chadwick 
v. Nielsen, 763 P.2d 817 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citing Girard v. 
Appleby, 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983)). 
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. MATERIAL UNDISPUTED FACTS 
The following material facts were presented in support 
of defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. It must again be 
noted that, although plaintiffs had the benefit of the deposition 
testimony of E. Roderick Ross and R. Earl Ross prior to 
defendants filing the second motion for summary judgment, 
plaintiffs never presented contradictory evidence nor disputed in 
any other way the following facts as set forth by defendants.2 
2
 Plaintiffs never filed counter affidavits. Although 
they took the depositions of Earl and Rod Ross prior to the 
second summary judgment motion, plaintiffs were not able to 
controvert any of defendants' facts. Plaintiffs' failure to 
(continued...) 
-4-
1. Insurance Investment Company ("IIC") is a Utah 
corporation in good standing. Pond Complaint f 2 (R. 002); Hyer 
Complaint in Intervention % 2 (R. 158); Answer % 2 (R. 033); 
Affidavit of Earl Ross (hereinafter "Ross Aff.") H 2 (R. 474). 
2. Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company 
("Equitable") is a Utah corporation in good standing and a Utah 
domestic insurance company. Pond Complaint % 2; Hyer Complaint 
in Intervention; Answer % 2; Ross Aff. % 3. 
3. IIC is a holding company which owns a majority of 
the outstanding Equitable common stock. Ross Aff. % 4. 
4. The remaining approximately 2 0 percent of 
outstanding Equitable common stock is owned by the public and 
defendants R. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross, R. Earl Ross's four 
sisters and mother and a trust for the primary benefit of R. Earl 
Ross's mother (the "Ross Family"). Icl. f 5. 
5. IIC has two classes of stock, namely voting common 
that is owned by members of the Ross Family, a family charitable 
foundation and Equitable, and non-voting preferred stock of which 
approximately 70 percent is owned by the Ross Family and 
Equitable and 30 percent is owned by plaintiffs and others. The 
preferred stock is non-voting and has an annual non-cumulative 
dividend right of $.06 per share. Id. % 6. 
2(...continued) 
controvert defendants' statement of undisputed facts as required 
by Rule 4-501 of the Rules of Judicial Administration was pointed 
out to the trial court in defendants' Reply Memorandum of Points 
and Authorities. See R. 557 at 2. 
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6. Plaintiff Leontine Pond owns 500 shares of IIC 
preferred stock. She does not now, nor did she in 1987, own any 
Equitable stock or IIC common stock. Complaint % 7, 32; Answer 
1 7; Ross Aff. H 7. 
7. Plaintiff Merle Hyer Company owns 1175 shares of 
IIC preferred stock. It did not in 1987, nor does it today, own 
any Equitable stock or IIC common stock. Hyer Complaint in 
Intervention, % 7; Answer to Hyer Complaint in Intervention U 7 
(R. 204); Ross Aff. % 8. 
8. In October of 1986, Bennett Leasing Company, as 
part of a hostile takeover attempt, entered into agreements with 
David E. Ross II, Galen Ross, and Betsy Ross Rapps (collectively 
the "Selling Group") to purchase their rights in IIC and the Ross 
Family foundation. If all such rights were acquired and control 
of the foundation obtained, Bennett Leasing may have acquired 
control of IIC and hence, control of Equitable. Ross Aff. % 9. 
9. Bennett Leasing failed to obtain approval of the 
Utah Department of Insurance as required by the Utah Insurance 
Code before staging its takeover attempt. Id. U 10. 
10. Bennett Leasing's hostile takeover eventually 
failed in the summer of 1987, when Equitable purchased all of 
Bennett Leasing's interest. This purchase was made after the 
Department of Insurance refused to grant Bennett Leasing the 
certification required by the Insurance Code. Icl. % 11. 
-6-
11. As a direct consequence of the Selling Group's 
attempted sale to Bennett Leasing, nine lawsuits were filed in 
1986 and 1987, in the Third District Court, involving Bennett 
Leasing, IIC, Equitable, the Ross Family, and the Selling Group. 
Id. H 12. 
12. The prospects of a hostile takeover and change in 
management directly contributed to a loss of Equitable's 
business. From 1986 to 1987, during the Bennett Leasing takeover 
attempt, Equitable's total premiums dropped 2.6%. From 1987 to 
1988, after the situation had stabilized, the total premiums rose 
19.4 percent. Id. 1 13. 
13. Throughout the Bennett Leasing controversy and 
again in August 1987, Equitable negotiated with the Selling Group 
to purchase their Equitable stock. Equitable desired to purchase 
the Selling Group's stock in order to stabilize Equitable, bring 
an end to mounting litigation, and prevent the prospect of a sale 
by the Selling Group to another corporate raider. The Utah 
Department of Insurance encouraged and urged Equitable to 
purchase the Selling Group's stock. Id. % 14. 
14. On or about October 30, 1987, Equitable, under the 
direction of its Board of Directors, entered into an agreement to 
purchase 11,802.23 shares of IIC common stock from the Selling 
Group. Because the Selling Group would not sell this controlling 
stock unless Equitable purchased all of their stock in all 
family-related corporations, Equitable also purchased 44,544.37 
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shares of Equitable common stock, 25,050.66 shares of IIC common 
stock, 25,050.66 shares of IIC preferred stock, and 9,793.10 
shares of National Housing Finance Syndicate (a family owned real 
estate investment company). Id. 
15. IIC was not a party to the Stock Purchase 
Agreement and played no part in Equitable's decision to purchase 
the stock. Id. 1 15. 
B. NATURE OF THE CASE AND DISPOSITION 
Both IIC and Equitable are separate and distinct Utah 
corporations, each with its principal place of business located 
in Salt Lake City. IIC is a stock holding company that owned 
less than 80 percent of Equitable common stock before the 1987 
purchase, but more than 80 percent of Equitable common stock 
after the 1987 purchase. Equitable in turn is engaged in the 
development and marketing of life and health insurance products. 
Equitable was founded in 1935 as Equitable Mutual Aid Protective 
Society by Dr. Roderick Earl Ross, the grandfather of the Ross 
Family. The Ross Family owns or controls all of the IIC's voting 
stock. Although some of the Ross Family serve on both 
Equitable7s and IIC's Board of Directors, the two boards are not 
identical. 
In October 1986, defendants Rod and Earl Ross, the 
primary officers of Equitable, became aware that Rod's brother, 
David Ross, his sister, Betsy Ross Rapps, and their uncle, Galen 
r, . \^KK\ OCQ1 "" O ~ 
Ross (the "Selling Group"), were secretly attempting to sell the 
control of Equitable to Bennett Leasing Company. At that time, 
David was the only member of the Selling Group who had any 
involvement in the management of Equitable. He was on 
Equitable's board and also served as corporate counsel. The 
Selling Group represented to Bennett Leasing that their stock, 
together with their control of a family charitable foundation, 
would give Bennett Leasing control of IIC and Equitable. 
Bennett Leasing failed to comply with the mandatory-
statutory requirements for taking over an insurance company, in 
that it failed to obtain approval for the takeover from the Utah 
Department of Insurance. This approval was necessary for the 
protection of Equitable's policy holders and public shareholders. 
As soon as Equitable discovered Bennett Leasing's hostile 
takeover attempt, Equitable moved under the insurance code to 
prevent the takeover, based on Bennett Leasing's failure to 
comply with the statutory requirements. Shortly thereafter, 
lawsuits were filed as the various factions in the Ross Family, 
Bennett Leasing, and the Selling Group positioned themselves. 
Galen Ross was the first to file a lawsuit in an attempt to gain 
control of the voting rights of the family charitable foundation 
that owned the controlling interest in IIC. In December 1986, 
Galen, David, and Betsy filed suit to enjoin the voting of 
certain stock. 
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Throughout the spring of 1987, Equitable continued to 
pressure the Department of Insurance to deny Bennett Leasing the 
right to stage a takeover. The Utah Insurance Commissioner was 
finally convinced that Bennett Leasing at that time lacked the 
ability to successfully operate Equitable and Bennett Leasing7s 
certification was not approved. To prevent a reapplication by 
Bennett Leasing and in an attempt to acquire the IIC common stock 
of the Selling Group to prevent future hostile takeovers, 
Equitable purchased Bennett Leasing's interests in the summer of 
1987. Equitable then attempted to exercise Bennett Leasing's 
agreement with Galen but not David or Betsy. This resulted in 
another lawsuit by the Selling Group to prevent Equitable from 
buying only Galen's stock. 
By the end of 1987, nine lawsuits had been filed, 
including a suit by Equitable against Bennett Leasing alleging 
RICO violations and against David for breach of his fiduciary 
duties as a director of Equitable. At one hearing, there were no 
fewer than 23 attorneys representing the different factions. 
The insurance business greatly relies upon not only the 
actual stability of the insurance company, but also the 
appearance of stability. The Selling Group's hostile takeover 
attempts damaged Equitable's image of stability and hence its 
business, particularly its relations with its selling agents. 
Ultimately, in August 1987, in an effort to stabilize 
Equitable and bring an end to the numerous lawsuits, Equitable 
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began serious negotiations with the Selling Group to purchase the 
Selling Group's IIC common stock. Attorney Daniel Jackson 
represented the Selling Group collectively in the negotiations. 
Initially, Equitable was only interested in purchasing the IIC 
common stock--the control stock--but the Selling Group refused to 
deal unless Equitable also purchased all their IIC preferred 
stock, their Equitable stock, and their stock in another family 
corporation, National Housing and Finance Syndicate. Ross Aff. 
% 14, R. 474. Throughout the negotiations with the Selling 
Group, Equitable's various offers were each based upon a single 
sum it was willing to pay for the Selling Group's entire 
stockholdings in all three corporations. The Selling Group then 
determined, amongst themselves, how they would divide this sum. 
However, during this time, the individual interests of the 
Selling Group became so adverse that each member of the group was 
advised to, and did in fact, retain separate legal counsel. 
The negotiations between Equitable and the members of 
the Selling Group continued over several months and culminated in 
a Stock Purchase Agreement, dated October 30, 1987. The Utah 
Insurance Commissioner had repeatedly encouraged such a 
settlement, and the Commissioner reviewed and formally approved 
the final agreement. As part of the agreement, all the parties 
dismissed their lawsuits. It is undeniably clear that the 
negotiations between Equitable and the Selling Group were 
conducted at arms length. Indeed, the negotiations were 
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characterized as "damn bloody". See Affidavit of Daniel Jackson, 
R. 452. The distance and divisiveness among the parties did not 
end when the Stock Purchase Agreement was finally closed in 
December 1987. In fact, at that point David characteristically 
contended that he was entitled to an additional consulting 
contract with Equitable valued at $200,000 as further 
consideration for his stock. Equitable refused to enter into 
this separate consulting agreement, resulting in yet another 
lawsuit as David attempted to rescind.3 
Plaintiffs' Claims. 
Plaintiffs in the present lawsuit each own shares of 
IIC preferred stock, but they do not own any shares of Equitable 
stock or IIC common stock.4 They are disgruntled because 
Equitable did not offer to buy their IIC preferred stock at the 
time it purchased the Selling Group's stock. Even though they 
allege a breach of fiduciary duty by Equitable's board of 
directors, they admit that Equitable "probably paid about the 
3
 Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company v. David E. 
Ross, II, Civil No. C-8804644, went to trial before Judge Moffat 
on December 17, 1990. Judgment was entered in Equitable's favor. 
The case is now on appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
4
 Although plaintiffs allege that their predecessors paid 
for the IIC preferred stock years ago and that they have been 
waiting ever since for a return on their investment, plaintiffs 
never developed this claim during the trial court proceedings. 
It is just as likely that the stock was issued to insurance 
policyholders when the corporate structure switched from a mutual 
insurance company to a stock company in the 1940s. This would 
explain why plaintiffs' stock is non-voting with only a $.06 
dividend right. See Transcript of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, 11/18/91, R. 740, 5:14-6:6, 15:11-25. 
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right price" for the stock and that Equitable was advantaged 
rather than harmed by purchasing the Selling Group's stock. See 
Plaintiffs' Statement of Answering Points and Authorities in 
Opposition to Motion to Dismiss, pp. 1-3, R. 87. They also admit 
that no harm came to Insurance Investment Company as a result of 
the transaction. Appellant's Brief at 41. 
Plaintiffs' prolix Complaint is not divided into 
separate claims for relief or causes of action.5 However, after 
long examination, it appears plaintiffs' claims are divided into 
two categories. Plaintiffs' first claim is based on the theory 
that IIC was partially liquidated when Equitable's assets were 
used to purchase the Selling Group's stock. A liquidation, if it 
had occurred, would have entitled plaintiffs, as IIC preferred 
shareholders, to share in the distribution of the assets of the 
corporation. Plaintiffs sought injunctive relief on this claim 
5
 The first 22 or so paragraphs in the complaint allege 
that class action status should be afforded these plaintiffs. 
Mrs. Pond's motions for class action certification were denied 
twice by Judge Sawaya. 
Paragraphs 26-3 8 of the Complaint appear to allege 
breach of fiduciary duties surrounding a tender offer Equitable 
made to purchase its common stock at $22.50 a share. This tender 
offer was independent of the purchase agreement with the Selling 
Group. Plaintiffs later admitted, however, in Response to 
Defendants' Requests for Admission that plaintiffs are not making 
any claim against any defendant on the ground that they have been 
damaged by the tender offer. Answers to Requests for Admissions 
No. 47, R. 463. 
Paragraphs 3 9-59 bounce back and forth between 
plaintiffs' claim that IIC was liquidated and their claim that 
defendants breached their fiduciary duties. The breach of 
fiduciary claim appears to be made in paragraphs 53-56. 
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asking that IIC be further liquidated and that their stock be 
purchased, or exchanged for Equitable stock. Complaint at 12, R. 
- 013. 
The trial court fully disposed of plaintiffs' 
liquidation claim on October 24, 1990, when it granted 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and entered an 
Order based on the undisputed fact that no liquidation of IIC, as 
contemplated by the Articles of Incorporation, had occurred. See 
Minute Entry dated September 25, 1990, R. 310; Order dated 
October 24, 1990, R. 317. 
Plaintiff's second category of claims, alleged in only 
four paragraphs in the Complaint, is based on a theory of breach 
of fiduciary duties allegedly owed plaintiffs by certain 
unspecified defendants in their capacities as directors and 
majority shareholders. The breach of fiduciary duty allegedly 
occurred when the unspecified defendants excluded plaintiffs in 
the distribution and liquidation of IIC assets, referred to in 
the first claim. Plaintiffs' complaint in this regard is vague; 
for instance, it does not distinguish between claims made against 
IIC and those made against Equitable's officers, directors, and 
shareholders. Complaint % 53-56, R. 002. Plaintiffs' claims 
were also not pleaded alternatively. As for relief, plaintiffs' 
demand for mandatory injunctive relief, based on an allegation 
that they had no adequate remedy at law, related only to their 
theory of a corporate liquidation. The sole remaining demand for 
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relief was for punitive damages only, with no demand for general 
and compensatory damages. Jd. at 12. 
IV. SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A. CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION WAS DENIED BECAUSE IT WAS 
OBVIOUS THAT THE NUMEROSITY AND TYPICALITY PRONGS WERE 
NOT MET 
Judge Sawaya twice denied plaintiffs' motions for class 
action certification. It was plainly apparent that the 
numerosity and typicality requirements of Rule 23(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure were not met. Despite plaintiffs' 
written solicitation to all IIC preferred shareholders to join as 
litigants in this action, only 10 additional shareholders 
demonstrated any interest. The numerosity requirement requires a 
demonstration that the proposed class is so numerous that joinder 
is impracticable. The typicality requirement requires a 
demonstration that there are other members of the preferred class 
who have the same grievance as plaintiffs. The limited interest 
shown by the members of the proposed class demonstrates that the 
requirements for class action certification were not met. 
B. PLAINTIFFS' LIQUIDATION CLAIM WAS DENIED BECAUSE IIC 
NEVER LIQUIDATED 
Judge Sawaya properly held that defendants were 
entitled to summary judgment denying plaintiffs' liquidation 
claim because the fact was undisputed that no liquidation of IIC, 
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as contemplated in its Articles of Incorporation, had ever 
occurred. 
C- THERE WERE SEVERAL GROUNDS TO SUPPORT A DISMISSAL OF 
PLAINTIFFS' BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIM 
1. Plaintiffs' Claims Fail Because They Are Not 
Equitable Shareholders As They Suppose. 
Plaintiffs' breach of fiduciary duty claim relies on 
the faulty premise that plaintiffs are Equitable minority 
shareholders because they own stock in Equitable's holding 
company, IIC. Equitable and IIC have separate corporate 
existences which are not altered because the Ross family is 
involved with both corporations. 6A W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of 
the Law of Private Corporations, § 2821 (perm. ed. 1989) . 
Stockholders in a holding company are not stockholders, nor 
entitled to rights of stockholders in the subsidiary of the 
holding company. 12B W. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of 
Private Corporations, § 5767 (perm. ed. 1984). 
IIC had no involvement whatsoever in the stock 
purchase. The ability of Equitable to act independently of its 
parent is not affected by the fact that some of the shareholders, 
officers, and directors of IIC and Equitable are the same. 6A W_^  
Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, § 2821 
(perm ed. 1989). 
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2 • The Purchase of the Selling Groups Stock Was 
Based on the Business Judgment of Eguitable's 
Board and Did Not Give Rise to a Duty to Purchase 
Plaintiffs/ IIC Preferred Stock. 
Equitable's board, according to its best judgment, 
elected to purchase the selling group's stock to (1) promote an 
orderly transaction of Equitable's business that had been damaged 
during the takeover bid; (2) eliminate divided loyalties among 
the various shareholder factions and assure that the selling 
group would not participate in another hostile takeover; and 
(3) bring an end to numerous lawsuits that were pending in the 
Third District Court. Equitable is entitled to deal selectively 
with its stockholders and was not required to purchase 
plaintiffs' stock. Any such decision is measured by the business 
judgment rule. 
3. Plaintiffs Did Not Suffer Direct Damage and 
Therefore Have No Individual Cause of Action, 
The fiduciary relationship of a director or officer of 
a corporation to shareholders is well recognized; however, that 
relationship is generally held to be between the directors and 
shareholders as a whole. Aside from the fact that IIC was not 
involved, these IIC shareholders cannot in their own right and 
for their own personal use and benefit, maintain an action for 
the recovery of corporate funds. 
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4. Plaintiffs' Demand for Punitive Damages is Not 
Permitted by Statute» 
Plaintiffs' demand for punitive damages only, as to 
their breach of fiduciary duty claim, is barred by Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-18-1(1) (a) which forbids an award of punitive 
damages unless general and compensatory damages are awarded. 
D. PLAINTIFFS' PROPOSED AMENDED COMPLAINT WAS FUTILE AND 
FAILED TO STATE A CLAIM 
It was proper to deny plaintiffs' motions to amend the 
Complaint and to join additional IIC preferred shareholders 
because the amendment was futile and failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted. Plaintiffs' proposed claim of 
oppressive corporate salaries stated a derivative claim belonging 
to IIC and/or Equitable. Their proposed claim concerning 
corporate dividends ignored the nature of their 6 percent non-
cumulative, non-voting, preferred stock with a $1.00 par value. 
V. ARGUMENT 
A. CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION WAS PROPERLY DENIED 
Plaintiffs sought class action certification on the 
basis that there were 105 IIC preferred shareholders similarly 
situated. 
It appeared to Judge Sawaya that this case was not 
appropriate for class action status so he twice denied 
plaintiffs' motion to certify. 
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Judge Sawaya's observation proved to be correct. 
During the course of discovery,, plaintiffs were provided wi tl 1 
IIC's s : y . Plain',::.!.; counsel wrote a letter to each 
of the preferred stockholders trying to enlist their support. 
Se e letter R. 576. Only Id i H i t i m i,i i IT 1 preferred 
shareholders responded with any desire to be included.6 
I The Requirements of Rule 23(a) Have Not Been Met. 
;\ 'I if- I ' l l h i \.> \ ) \ d l i l t , a J li<-J'i '.'111 y I t ( "'1! I 
prerequisites have been satisfied. Eisen v. Carlisle & 
Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 1 r:b, 94 P,H:. 2140, 40 L.Ed.2d 731 -"^ , 
Rule 23 (a.) :i)f the Uta 1 i Rules of Civil Procedure states: 
(a) Prerequisites to a class action. One or 
more members of a class may sue or be sued as 
representative parties on behalf of all only 
if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder 
of all members is impracticable, (2) there 
are questions of law or fact common to the 
class, (3) the claims or defenses of the 
representative parties are typical of the 
claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the 
representative parties will fairly and 
adequately protect the interests of the 
class. (emphasis added^ 
The burden was on plaintiffs to demonstrate that: these 
required prerequisites '^c r---r ~^ *~ ;-d that a class action could 
tai ntai necl -auou^- .. ..uantv rood Sales, Inc., b 1.1 F . 2d 
' These 10 additional preferred shareholders were those 
who sought to intervene in this lawsuit after defendants filed 
their second and final motion for summary judgment. When Judge 
Sawaya denied their motion to intervene, they filed a separate 
complaint, Broadbent, et al. v. Equitable Life &. Casualty, et 
al., Civil No. 920902649CV. That lawsuit has been stayed upor ' 
stipulation, pending the outcome of this appeal. 
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230 (10th Cir. 1975); Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar 
Company, 503 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1974); 3B Moore's Federal 
Practice, % 23.02-2 (2nd Ed.). 
While the complaint and plaintiff's Motion to Maintain 
a Class Action mimicked Rule 23 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, they failed to demonstrate that the prerequisites to 
the maintenance of a class action had been met. See Richardson 
v. Arizona Fuels Corp., 614 P.2d 636 (Utah 1980); Rossin v. 
Southern Union Gas Co., 472 F.2d 707, 712 (10th Cir. 1973). 
a* The Numerosity and Typicality Requirements 
Were Not Met. 
Each requirement of Rule 23 (a) must be given an 
independent meaning. Redhouse v. Quality Food Sales, Inc., 511 
F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975). The numerosity requirement, Rule 
23(a)(1), requires a demonstration that the proposed class is so 
numerous that joinder is impracticable. Taylor v. Safeway 
Stores, Incorporated, 524 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1975). The 
Broadbent lawsuit filed by the other preferred shareholders 
demonstrates that joinder was practical and therefore the 
numerosity requirement was not met. 
The typicality requirement, Rule 23(a)(3), requires 
that plaintiffs demonstrate that there are other members of the 
proposed class who have the same or similar grievances as 
plaintiffs. Certainly plaintiffs' claim cannot be typical of the 
claims of an entire class if the other members of the proposed 
class do not feel aggrieved. Plaintiffs needed to demonstrate 
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that the other members of the class they wanted to represent had 
the same grievances of which plaintiffs complained. Plainti ffs 
needed to demonstrate in some manner that other preferred 
shareholders had a compLaini. White v. Gates Rubber Company. 53 
to al.. wt • ne other preferred shareholders and tine l:mirei 
interest shown . \ : espcnse demonstrates * ^.H" *-'r<=- -ypzcai'^v 
r e q i ; i •--*=• ._- .. _ • - ; . , : . j . -
 :. r - . - - : . -_-
shareholders apparently preferred to retain their sr_ ck ;a:her 
than sell * ~.s oroposed : :: "he Comriaint. 
'. - :«•.-•_•_ i : th:ip_v ..-;_,... noi support a contention that 
Judge Sawaya misapplied the iaw or tnat ne abused his discretion. 
The denial of class ac- i ' y~ • ' : +,: ' * -' : • • : :* - -*''' -Tie i . 
JUDGE SAWAYA PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' LIQUIDATION 
CLAIM 
Defendants' f irs^ ^^ *:-^ n ~~y -artial summarv ^ : dement 
Ai <E • :|1""" "+ Qir '' :?• :::ad t :: di - v . :<.i/'ion r1
 ;. 
Defendants supported rneir statement of undisputed faots with the 
affidavit - : ? H'ar1 P~ss . President Itsurance Tnvestment 
oral argument, -Judge Sawaya found that a liquidation :f insurance 
Ir'^srne^ ""T.r.nr." as conte^r: ried in ILS A5* 
u.v.:;.hi-t:.;ri i^u never occu.r^d. 
Tne undisputed facts set cr • i defendants' memorandum, 
R. 2 54, incl i id : 
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1. Insurance Investment Company has never in its 
corporate existence dissolved or liquidated its assets, wound 
down its affairs, or ceased to exist as a corporate entity. The 
sole business activity conducted by Insurance Investment Company 
is the holding of Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company 
stock. This business activity has in no way been altered as a 
result of Equitable's purchase of Insurance Investment Company 
preferred stock from members of the Ross Family. R. Earl Ross 
Aff. %<h 9/ 10 (R. 264). 
2. Equitable Life and Casualty Insurance Company has 
never in its corporate existence dissolved, liquidated its 
assets, wound down its affairs, or ceased to exist as a corporate 
entity. Equitable is in the insurance business which business 
activity has not been diminished in any respect as a result of 
Equitable's purchase of Insurance Investment Company's preferred 
stock from members of the Ross Family. Ld. UH H ' 12. 
1. No Liquidation of IIC Ever Occurred, 
Plaintiffs claimed that a partial liquidation of IIC 
occurred which triggered certain rights in their favor pursuant 
to IIC's amended Articles of Incorporation, which read: 
In the event of any liquidation, dissolution 
or winding up of this corporation, the holders of 
Preferred Stock shall be entitled to be paid in 
full the par value thereof before any amount shall 
be paid or any assets distributed to the holders 
of Common Stock Class "A", and after the payment 
to the holders of Common Stock Class "A" of an 
amount equal to the par value of said Common Stock 
Class "A" the remaining assets of this corporation 
shall be divided and paid to the holders of 
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Preferred Stock and the holders of Common Stock 
Class "A" according to the number of their 
respective shares. 
The second issi ie t a ised by p] a int:if f s ' appeal addresses 
this claim... Plaintiffs never disputed the fact that IIC had 
n ever 1 i q u i d a. t e d.. R a t h. e r, t h e i r c 1 a i m r e 1 i e d o n t h e s i n g ] e 
pi; emise 11 ia,t Equitable ' s purchase of the IIC preferred stock 
constituted a "partial liquidation.; " although that term, is not 
found in the amended A 3 : t: cl es of I no : rp :)] : at: :)i :i Tl le - \ par tial 
liquidation is unique to the tax code ai id is not a. liquidation as 
contemplated in the amended Articles of Incorporation. J i idge 
S a v r a. y a g r a n t e :I t: 1: I s i i: t c t: i o i i f c • i: s u i i 11 i: i a i: } j i i, d g m e n t, e x p 1 a i n i n g t h a t a 
liquidation as contemplated in the Articles of Incorporation had 
never occurred. 
Judge Sawaya's decision is supported by an 
overwhelming majority of decisions in. both federal and state 
jurisdiction . A\\: \ . " . .. r ... ss :i s to 
assemble a m ^rx-xij-j t ^ v,oipuidtic:r s assets, settle wi/:; *'e 
creditors and debtors *:i : apportion *: h- remaining assets :*' 
'^ •"
 ;
 ' '" '
 ;
""- J:^:=U States v ivietcaif, 
11 >" . 2d 6 ," :', u "/ -J ; Jt;: ; . . ; r4 ^  ; Rothschild International 
Corporation v. Liggett Group Inc. , 4 ^  < - ?d -4." c -• - vCt. '"": . 
• - .-: .:,-JLKL. . _.-. aurui^ u- LNitnTiQuib u. „mpany - :.. -J 
F.^ .d . - - - ? ": ' --: '• iquiaat: on is the process of 
reducing assess *"-^  '-J-~ - T-na^ain xiabilit i <-r-^  and di^idiii'i 
• ^  : — -• — > •' • United States , 3 7 4 F . Supp . 10 b 1, 1 u F 5 
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(E.D. Tenn. 1972) . To liquidate is to wind up the affairs of a 
company by getting in the assets, settling with the debtors and 
creditors, and appropriating the amount of profit or loss. State 
ex rel. Gibson v. American Bonding & Casualty Co., 281 N.W. 172, 
175 (Iowa 1938) . Furthermore, in order to liquidate a business, 
the business must "cease to exist as a corporate entity." 
Rothschild International Corporation v. Liggett Group Inc., 463 
A.2d 642, 646 (Ct. Ch. Del. 1983). Liquidating a business means 
permanently terminating the affairs of the business. Ex parte 
Amos, 114 So. 760, 765 (Fla. 1927). 
"Liquidation" is a term of art that describes a 
situation in which the corporation winds up its affairs and 
distributes its assets to those entitled to receive them. In re 
Brock's Estate, 218 A.2d 281, 289 (Pa. 1966). Courts 
consistently apply this well-defined meaning of liquidation in 
cases where preferred shareholders claim a right to payment under 
their respective corporation's Articles of Incorporation. See 
Fletcher, Cyclopedia Corporations, § 7698 (1979). 
Equitable's acquisition of the IIC preferred stock was 
a mere transfer of stock and clearly does not meet the widely-
accepted definition of "liquidation." 
2. Plaintiff&' Reliance on the Tax Code is Misplaced, 
In defining "liquidation," Plaintiffs rely on cases 
interpreting the Internal Revenue Code. In fact, plaintiffs cite 
to over half a dozen such opinions primarily for the proposition 
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that even if a corporation has not wound up its affairs or 
"liquidated" in t }>- widely-accepted sense, a partial liquidation-
- a s d ^  f i n ^  d in u 1 ^  F r 11 e r n a 1 R e, r e n u e «,." o <. J e - - c an occur. After 
referring to nine such cases in their trial court memoranda, 
plaintiffs surprisingly, but correctly, stated that" t h-> FRS 
definition 'it |jdil. jiil liquidation does not apply to the present 
case.7 
Until fairly recent 1 y ,  In > * i shareholder couched a 
payment he received n ^ m a ;.rpoia: :i :.aa significant * :>; 
consequences. ": " ::e shareholder r^^ei'^-d a dividend from *~he 
-
1
 re.-:--r - .-;-.*- : :/:ome ar.a ^ 
shareholder was laxea appropriately according \c :11s individual 
r.ax hracke*" TP. however *" ^  rav^-rr was consi d-~-i- -
:-]ei!ii :. Lrt.i ;i.ia;_:. . ^ n capita- g a m s La*"-?s 
applied ana the shareholder was generally taxed a~ a .':w--> * 
C^nqress scecificaxa iec:- i ' ^  - • - ;, :, 
__: <- herm thai seems unique i. J tax joae cai^ctii'ie . n a s m u c h 
as liquidation is normally an A \ , • -:c:v::ng affai- •r-^.y-^.- ^n 
the rax ood~ i^ f i ii* - . f 
a contraction oi _^e cuipoiaLicn's business. .-.r:<er and 
7
 Plaintiffs stated: "Since the instant matter does not 
solely concern tax matters, the finder of fact will not be 
confined to the corresponding definitions in deciding whether 
there has been 'any liquidation' entitling the preferred 
shareholders to the same payment per share as the common 
shareholders. Rather, the more general common definitions will 
apply." Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, dated August 17, ±Q9Q, p. 8, R. 278. 
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Eustice, Federal Income Taxation of Corporations and 
Shareholders, 1f 9.52 (1971) . Case law has developed in the tax 
courts as taxpayers/shareholders have litigated whether a partial 
liquidation and a contraction in business can occur even if the 
corporation remains an ongoing concern. A partial liquidation as 
defined in the tax code has nothing to do with the instant case; 
but even if it did, there was never a contraction in IIC's 
business. Instead, the 1987 purchase resulted in IIC owning a 
larger portion of Equitable. Ross. Aff. R. 264 H 9, 10, R. 264. 
The use of the term "liquidate" in IIC's amended 
Articles of Incorporation necessarily refers to a complete 
winding up of IIC's business because it calls for preferred 
shareholders to be paid first upon the event of any liquidation, 
dissolution, or winding up of the corporation. The same sentence 
then goes on to provide how all of the "remaining assets" are to 
be distributed. This could only be referring to the non-tax type 
of liquidation, i.e., a complete liquidation. 
Plaintiffs' reliance on the Internal Revenue Code in 
this case is simply misplaced. Judge Sawaya properly found, 
based on the undisputed facts, that no liquidation of IIC, as 
contemplated in the Articles of Incorporation, had ever occurred. 
The Summary Judgment must be affirmed. 
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f JUDGE SAWAYA PROPERLY DENIED PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING 
CLAIMS 
!ur m i r d , fourth, and fifth issues raised by 
plaintiffs' appeal d ^ J w:*r ooints addressed in defendants' 
se.::: . . :. .- ::gment, regarding plaintiffs' 
remaining claim fcr breach of fiduciary duties. The motion, for 
summary ^uiicmer/: addressed mmb^r nf alternate grounds to 
dereai p^air.n its' claim. v«:.en he granted the motion, Judge 
Sawaya entered a short minute entry that did not suggest the 
b a s i s for ' MI " d^i'iMiMii i'nr t \ i a i ' n i i i i . ' , i i j j u i t : : r. u c o m p l y w i t h 
the last sentence of Rule 52(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, requiring a brief written statement of fhp qr-nnds for 
i t , decisn »ii, d» > e s J i< »l inakt i t he judgment defective, but., 
admittedly, it makes this court's task more difficult. Allen v. 
Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance Company , H j 9 I-', 2d " ' {J8 
(Utah 1992) , On appeal plaintiffs have elected to raise each 
alternative ground upon wn: :h defendant relied ;: *•- ^:: me c ion. 
Wh^n rPV -* * : . u : resume 
the decision u^ oe correct: and must ^ea:on rcr grounds upon which 
it may be .no:-- :' : ~m *": ng College Irr. Co -c ?a:. Rive: _* 
Blacksmi ...
 x_r„^ ^ „ ^ . ._ . u. : ' :e 
court determine that summary yjagmeu: wc.- proper, even if for a 
reason n ^ t assigned bv -b^ *"v*: a — - ' * ---^  **---: u* - - e 
a f t i. rmed ^ . ^ ~ i n.. J^ .«. u„ . •:. OA1^ A s s ^ i a t e s , - c 1. 2u ^ 2 
(Utah 1938, ; Rice Melbv Enterprises, Inc. v. Salt Lake County, 
646 P.2d 696, 698 n.3 (Utah 1 982). 
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1. The Fact That Plaintiffs Are Not Equitable 
Shareholders Is Fatal to Their Claim. 
While plaintiffs continue to tout that their claims 
cannot be avoided by corporate artificialities, the facts remain 
unchanged that (a) Equitable, not IIC, was involved in purchasing 
the Selling Group's stock, and (b) plaintiffs are not Equitable 
shareholders. These facts cannot simply be dismissed as 
immaterial. Plaintiffs, here and before the trial court, cited 
Brown v. Tenney, 532 N.E.2d 230 (111. 1988), as primary support 
for their contention that as shareholders of a holding company, 
they are not barred from suing as individual shareholders for 
actions taken by the subsidiary. Brown v. Tenney addressed 
whether Illinois corporate law recognizes a shareholder's right 
to bring a double derivative suit. In a double derivative suit a 
shareholder of a holding company seeks to enforce a right 
belonging to the subsidiary, and only derivatively to the holding 
company. 
Brown v. Tenney does not stand for the proposition that 
shareholders of a holding company are de facto minority 
shareholders of the subsidiary, or that shareholders of the 
holding company can bring individual claims against the 
subsidiary as indirect minority shareholders. In fact, Brown v. 
Tenney supports Equitable's argument that IIC is the Equitable 
stockholder, not plaintiffs; and if there is a stockholder claim 
to be asserted against Equitable, it must be made by the actual 
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stockholder, and if IIC refuses, then by IIC's shareholders in a 
derivative action. 
The ! "iw remains uncontradicted by Brown v. Tenney, or 
any ether _:ase ;::~ed cy plaintiffs, that plaintiffs, as 
stockholder- m a noidina —rear" • - t 
.r , ;,< . . ::• . . nor entzt^ea t. ' ne r:ah: - .: stockholders in :he 
subsidiary IkB W. Letcher, Cyclopedia of the law of Priva*e 
Cc rpcra 111: ,-•- : <;-;'— jcrcora*". -r 
existence cecween a .:'^ di:i_j jempany ana ;:s subsidiary _s n:t 
disturbed simply because th° *"AC rc^poritions are -v- -'d 
,3ini share some 1 the Sciin^  d Lrectors, otficers, or shareholders. 
[A] holding company is generally held not to be 
doing or transacting business through its 
subsidiary where the separate corporate entities 
are maintained. By the same token, the creation 
of a holding company does not affect the separate 
and continuing existence of the corporation whose 
stock in holds, nor is the situation altered 
simply because the stockholders, directors and 
other of f ;,""•=> vq of - v— two companies are identical. 
hi\ w. Fletcher, Cyclopedia of the Law of Private Corporations, 
§ 2821 (perm. ed. 1989) . 
The Law in Massachusetts That in Closely Held 
Corporations the Corporation Must Ratably Purchase 
Shares From Minority Shareholders is Not the Law 
in Utah, The Purchase of the Selling Group's 
Stock Was Based on the Business Judgment of 
Equitable's Board and Did Not Give Rise to a Duty 
to Purchase Plaintiffs' TIC Preferred Stock. 
Plaintiffs cite Donahue v. Redd Electrotype Co, of New 
England, Inc., 323 N~E.2d 505 Ma." *- propos-
Llicit i I i closely held corporation purchases shares from its 
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majority shareholders, it owes an equal opportunity to minority 
shareholders to ratably sell their shares.8 While this may be 
the law in Massachusetts, it is not the law in Utah, Lochhead v. 
Alacano, 697 F. Supp. 406 (D. Utah 1988); Nash v. Craigco, 585 
P.2d 775 (Utah 1978); In re Black, 787 F.2d 503, 506 (10th Cir. 
1986), and represents a rule of law that has been rather soundly 
rejected. Clacrett v. Hutchison, 583 F.2d 1259, 1264 (4th Cir. 
1978); McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545, 547 (10th Cir. 1969). 
Equitable's decision to purchase the Selling Group's 
stock was based on rational and compelling business 
justifications. Donahue and the other cases cited by plaintiffs 
all relate to a preferential liquidation or minority shareholder 
"freeze out," where a majority shareholder caused the corporation 
to purchase his shares, for no other justification than to favor 
that majority shareholder. In contrast, Equitable's decision to 
purchase the Selling Group's IIC common stock was based on 
several rational and even compelling business justifications: (a) 
to stabilize control of Equitable, (b) to put an end to the 
divisiveness among the owners of IIC voting common stock, and (c) 
to end all ongoing litigation. In order to accomplish this 
business objective, Equitable was forced to purchase all the 
Selling Group's stock, including their IIC preferred stock. 
8
 The court must remain cognizant of the fact that it was 
Equitable that purchased the selling group's stock, not IIC. 
Plaintiffs are not Equitable shareholders. To extend plaintiffs' 
argument would require any purchaser of stock to buy out all of 
the corporation's other shareholders. 
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In contrast to Donahue and the other cases cited by 
plaintiffs, the more recent case of Delahoussaye v, Newhard, 785 
:
 W , 2 d 6 ">' < \P]ri A i"i f" 19 9 0 ) i s pe r sua.s i v e ,. The re t he dire c tors 
ot a close corporation decided to purchase over half of the 
corporation's 550
 r 000 outstanding shares from two fami ] i es 
represented \ \i*> budr: d The corporation purchased the shares 
in order to i1i eliminate ongoing dissension on the board; (2) 
promote orderly transaction D£ bus„i i i,ess ; and (3 ) B 1 i„„mi ri„at:„e 
divided loyalties. M* Plaintiffs claimed that the directors 
violated a fiduciary duty when they redeemed shares from, 
shareho] dei s wh 3 were a ] s :> : f f i cers and, :3 i r ect< :)i s , bi it denied 
plaintiffs' request to ratably redeem, their shares on comparable 
terms. Jd. at 6 0,9, The court held that the minority 
shareholder s wei e i i : t: si it it led to ratable redemption where 
directors; for business purposes, redeem, some outstanding shares. 
Id. at 611. 
Courts 'Ai.i^ a./ recognize that if a corporation's actions 
are motivated by va::i business purposes, the -corporation is 
protected LL " il -:..•- - - •_.  i::]|: ie Eqi i,i tab] e 
board were motivate; , .la business judgment that buying out of 
the dissident stockholders wa^ necessar; * maintain ~*~-
exi stfinrp " - ^, , a 
decision. Zheiz v. Mathes, 1 ^ P.^i '":' •*-* ."-. -*- t 
Equitable ^ -nti"1^d t^ deal selective- WJLLII its 
stockholder .-..-. - . A s measure^ ;v <-he 
s:\pbb\2691 -31-
standards of the business judgment rule. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa 
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. Supr. 1985). Under the 
business judgment rule there is the presumption that in making a 
business decision the directors of Equitable acted on an informed 
basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that the action 
taken was in the best interests of the company. Aronson v. 
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. Supr. 1984). So long as the 
Equitable Board's decision can be attributed to any rational 
business purpose, the trial court may not substitute its judgment 
for that of the board. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 4 93 
A.2d 946 (Del. Supr. 1985). 
3. Plaintiffs Have No Claim for Relief Even if There 
Were a Genuine Issue of Fact Surrounding the 
Motive for the Purchase of the Selling Group's 
Stock, 
Plaintiffs had an opportunity to depose Rod and Earl 
Ross, Equitable's President and Chief Executive Officer, 
respectively. The Rosses testified about the complicated 
distribution of IIC voting common stock between the various 
members of their family including family trusts and charitable 
foundations. From these facts, plaintiffs inferred that the true 
reason for the Selling Group stock purchase had nothing to do 
with the Bennett Leasing takeover; instead, it was a culmination 
of Rod and Earl Ross' continuing efforts to gain control of 
Equitable. This, they claim, created an issue of fact and is 
really the crux of their argument. See Appellants' Brief, % 23 
at 9; Id. at 39. 
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As plaintiffs' theory goes, Equitable's purchase of the 
Selling Group's stock was supposedly carried out to facilitate 
Rod and Earl Ross 1 efforts to gain control of Equitable and. not 
to "serve Equitable's best: interests according to its directors' 
bi is i ness ji idgment Therefore , Equitabl e shoi ill d a ] s :: 1 lave 
purchased plaintiffs'" stock. The defect: in this theory is that 
it is undisputed that the IIC preferred stock which plaintiffs 
o1; i 1 as A e ] ] e \IC preferred stock sold by the Selling 
Group, does not affect the control of Equitable in any way, 
shape, or form,. The IIC preferred stock is n^rvvoti i ig stock 
::.e centre. ^: -^  .n .:s voting common st ic^ ...a A-,.- the 
stock that Bennett Leasing nad secretly scuant ::c purchase. "he 
on v -^ -;.q '- i • -I • r •• i --- • • "•- . : t:-irei 
stock was because tne S e n u i g Group .nsisced. Equicacie nad -*? 
interes*" ~r *~'r.^ preferred st^c*, it? acquisition did nc^rvr.T 
illogical. 
~ ~ :• a un-i i s r ^ - ^ d " ;:^t- - h ° n . o q o u i a t i o n s w i t r t h - S e a l i n g 
GJI: DU. v %:_;'_-_/^r p o w e r p l a y t . . ^ u n ; : ; 
might wish * . inter rr:m c:tr transaction. ..: is st:L. undisputed 
that Equitable :• : * •ur'-his^ '"h- Selling Group's i~ ' •--<=•r-'-^ ed. 
-^ JO- :. »:e: ' : •- . the Selling Groi ip over the othei IIC 
preferred shareholders, or t : freeze cu* tnese preferred 
shareholders wr ' '^ •-.-.- rorporati on. 
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4. The Law in Utah is That a Cause of Action For Any 
Breach of Fiduciary Duty by Corporate Officers 
Belongs to the Corporation and Not to Stockholders 
Individually, 
Defendants argued to the trial court that even if 
plaintiffs could overcome the facts that (a) Equitable, not IIC, 
was involved in the Selling Group transaction, and (b) plaintiffs 
are not Equitable stockholders, plaintiffs still have no 
individual cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty. In In 
re Black, 787 F.2d 503 (10th Cir. 1986), the court held that 
[u]nder Utah law, a corporate officer owes a 
fiduciary duty to the corporation and to its 
shareholders. See Richardson v. Arizona Fuels 
Corp., 614 P.2d 636, 639 (Utah 1980). However, 
this duty is owed to the shareholders 
collectively, and no fiduciary duty is owed to the 
stockholders individually. Id. at 639-40. Thus 
Utah follows the general rule that any cause of 
action "on account of any breach by [corporate 
officers] of their fiduciary duty as directors and 
officers . . . belong[s] to the corporation and 
not to the stockholders individually." Id. at 
640. (Emphasis added.) 
In Delahoussave v. Newhard, supra 785 S.W.2d 609, the 
court reached this same conclusion as to duty to all 
shareholders. Although the Delahoussave court held that the 
corporation's purchase of its stock was motivated by legitimate 
business purposes, the major rationale for dismissing plaintiffs' 
claim rested on another legal argument. The court explained that 
plaintiffs' complaint proceeded entirely on a theory that a 
breach of fiduciary duty had occurred because the directors 
redeemed the shares of other minority shareholders and not 
plaintiffs' shares. Id. at 613. The court rejected that theory, 
-34-
holding that in the absence of statutory support or some special 
obligation, plaintiffs' allegations failed to state a cause of 
action. 
The court stated that plaintiffs' complaint was an 
attempt to allege indirect in-jury, ^h^n rH rv^t in|in • 1-
necessary tor plaint itfs to have an individual cause of action. 
Id. at 613. The court defined direct injury: 
[a]ctions based upon torts where the injur y is 
done directly to an individual shareholder, 
director or officer as such, depriving him, fa 
shareholder] of his rights, for instance, 
wrongfully expelling him or refusing to allow him 
to inspect the corporate books and records, are 
actions which may be brought by shareholders as 
individuals . , . Ordinarily an action based on 
acts relating to the capital stock as an entirety 
is a corporate cause of action and cannot be sued 
for by a shareholder merely as an i ndi vi dual. 
Id, au », i „ iquoting oieseimann v. Stegeman, 4 4 3 S,W.2d 12 7, 131 
(Mo. 1969)i 
I i ke j i 1 - i i n t :i f f s ' • ::ai ise o f act: :i • :>n i i I Delahoussa ye, 
plaintiffs* allegations here failed to state a cause of action. 
5. Punitive Damages Cannot be Awarded When .No General 
or Compensatory Damages Are Sought. 
1;; "':\e acr' : ""^n bel-w. cLair *~ : f ".- asked p"v - -vo *'" orms of 
re] i ef ba^~ {•>• -- - . ? > . : : : \ b ) 
their breach OL nduciary aucy ciair \s r:o zr.eii liquidation 
claim, plai nr i f f ? ask^d p^r mandatory nr'm.crive relief :•" 
.-.. . -tbi - - : . . . . . ' .:e grounds they riad no adequaT.-r 
remedy at i;^ - Complaint * r -: ."he relief they sought 
would have required Equitable * : h •"-* ' '- -•' red 
s:\pbb\2 6 91 
stock and related solely to plaintiffs' liquidation claim. The 
trial court fully disposed of plaintiffs' liquidation claim on 
October 24, 1990, when it granted Defendants' Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment. As to their breach of fiduciary duty claim, 
plaintiffs directed the claim against officers, directors and 
shareholders, namely Rod and Earl Ross, not the corporations. 
Plaintiffs asked for punitive damages only on this claim. Ld. at 
12. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-18-1(1) (a) forbids an award of 
punitive damages unless general and compensatory damages are 
awarded. The statute states: 
Except as otherwise provided by statute, punitive 
damages may be awarded only if compensatory or 
general damages are awarded and it is established 
by clear and convincing evidence that the acts or 
omissions of the tortfeasor are the result of 
willful and malicious or intentionally fraudulent 
conduct, or conduct that manifests a knowing and 
reckless indifference toward, and a disregard of, 
the rights of others. (Emphasis added.) 
The case of Nash v. Craigco, Inc., 585 P.2d 775 (Utah 
1978) does not support the contention that plaintiffs were 
entitled to punitive damages against the Rosses where their 
liquidation claim sought equity against Equitable and IIC. 
Plaintiff did not alternatively seek damages against the 
corporation. Indeed, had plaintiffs been granted the injunctive 
relief they sought there would have been no other measurable 
damages. 
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In Atkin Wright & Miles v. Mountain States Telephone & 
Telegraph, 709 P.2d 330 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme Court, 
comprised t different members than the Nash court, held . 
unequivocally that punitive damages are not recoverable unless 
the plaintiff recovers compensatory damaqes. 
In LLLuHi the court stated that , " |w]hile the cases 
generally hold that the amount of punitive damages must bear some 
reasonable^ relation l"' l l"K:i mKumt ^i .ulual ddindgi-'o awarded, this 
is not necessarily true." But five years later in Cruz v. 
Montova, 660 P.2d 72^, 727 (Utah 1 9 8 ^ , the Court stated more 
i !-• r '- • . .: . u u j e s i± iert to the 
jury's discretion oweve:. punitive damages must rear \ 
reasonable relaticnshic to actual damaa--." 
.:•.-* Li'^e::: case, piai::ti:;s stated very clearly 
that they had no adequate remedy at .a* :—± Complaint % [:,7 ,r 
R, 002. While the Nash decision \\\H\ per mi I iin award M1 fnniii i ;»-•• 
damages when the only other relief sought against the same 
defendant is equitable, neither Nash no? the statiute ter,v ;: an 
a W d : . . - • ' - - • -••-•• \\y±,
 t. . t :..--. .,tU-..-: 'V :H 
punitive damages is sought against the other defendants. 
Plaintiffs' contention that t.hey sough*:" whatever additional 
-" •• • . - L . ;.;..;. u:;ig ...-emaps 
compensatory damages from the Rosses,, even though their demand 
was only for punitive damages, is merely an afterthc • -
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contradicts paragraph 57 of their complaint and ignores their 
failure to alternatively demand compensatory damages. 
D. JUDGE SAWAYA DID NOT ABUSE HIS DISCRETION WHEN HE 
DENIED PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO AMEND THE COMPLAINT AND TO 
ALLOW INTERVENTION OF ADDITIONAL PREFERRED STOCKHOLDERS 
Plaintiffs filed their motions to allow an amended 
complaint and to intervene as a response to defendants' second 
and final motion for summary judgment. In fact, Judge Sawaya did 
not rule on plaintiffs' motions until he had granted the motion 
for summary judgment that dismissed plaintiffs' remaining claim. 
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying an amendment 
after dismissing all of the existing claims. 
A trial court may properly deny a motion to amend if it 
determines the proposed amendment is futile. See Bache Halsey 
Stuart Shields v. Tracy Collins Bank & Trust, 558 F.Supp. 1042, 
1044 (D. Utah 1983) (holding that leave to amend should be denied 
when the proposed amendment is frivolous, legally insufficient, 
or subject to dismissal); Conrad v. Imatani, 724 P.2d 89 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 1986) (holding that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion when it denied plaintiff's motion to amend when 
summary judgment motion established proposed amendment was 
futile). See also De Robert v. Gannett Corp., Inc., 551 F.Supp. 
973 (D. Hawaii 1982) (holding that leave to amend was properly 
denied when proposed amendment would be futile)/ Burt v. Blue 
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Shield of Southwest Idaho, 5 91 F.Supp. 75 5 (S.D. Ohio 1984) 
(stating these principles). 
Tl: ] e p r o p o s e d Amended Compia i nl w.-i:-; I: ul: i i ^ ..--iLICJ iriubj^'.'t. 
to dismissal because it reiterated the identical claims that had 
already been adjudicated (claims for class action certification, 
1 iqu:i :iat: ioi i of 11C ai id breach of f iduciar y dut y ) ,r::.ermore, 
the proposed amended complaint asserted claims upon which relief 
c o i I ] d n o t " B b e e n g r a n t e J 
Plaintiffa ' Claim of Alleged Oppressive Conduct 
Failed to State a Claim Upon Which Relief May Be 
Granted. 
1 1 a i i 11 :i £ f s • j: i: :i) p o s e d Ai i i e i i • :i e d C o i: i: tp ] a i i 11: a d d e d a sec o i i d 
cause of action that was not a part: of their earlier complaint, 
i n which they ai leged that IIC must be ] liquidated pursuant to 
Utah Code Ai n ) § ] 6 ] 0 92 (a) because of a continuirig pattern of 
conduct that was oppressive to IIC minority shareholders. 
Plaintiffs alleged that IIC1" s d i J i dei id pol i cy was oppressi ve and 
that I I C s officers' salaries were excessive. This second ca ;se 
of action was futile, because both claims failed to stac~ a c^^^m 
.". ' v wh :i ch i el i ef coi il d be gi ai ited. 
s i Plaintiffs' Stock is 6% Non-Cumulative 
Preferred Stock. 
Plaintiffs complained that IIC rarely declared -* 
dividend and that when it did plaintiffs only recei ved >-. paltry 
si : share The} a ] s : • : ] a :ii i ned tl: lat tl: le past d :i 1! iden is 
represented only a small fraction of the corporation's assets, 
Proposed Amended complaint f 79-82., R. 529. Apparent] y 
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plaintiffs have never fully understood that their stock is 6% 
non-cumulative, non-voting, preferred stock with a $1.00 par 
value. By definition, if a dividend is declared by IIC's board 
of directors, preferred shareholders are entitled, if the 
declared dividend is large enough, to 6% of the $1.00 par value 
or $.06 per share, and no more. After the preferred shareholders 
receive their dividend, the common shareholders receive whatever 
remains of the declared dividend. If the declared dividend is 
insufficient to pay $.06 per share to the preferred stockholders, 
or if there is no dividend declared, the shortfall does not carry 
forward to the next declared dividend because the preferred stock 
is non-cumulative. The declaration of dividends, if allowed by 
the financial stability of the corporation, is permissive, not 
mandatory, Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-41 and Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
64D9, and rests within the sound discretion of the board of 
directors. As plaintiffs' "seminal" case, Donahue v. Rodd 
Electrotype of New England, Inc., 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975), 
states, 
The courts prefer not to intervene . . . with 
the sound financial management of the corporation 
by its directors, but declare as a general rule 
that the declaration of dividends rests within the 
sound discretion of the directors . . . 
. . . Plaintiffs who seek judicial assistance 
against corporate dividend or employment policies 
do not prevail. 
9
 Until recent amendments were made to the Corporations 
Code, dividends were based on the unreserved and unrestricted 
surplus of the corporation. Id. 
cs \nbb\2691 -40-
323 N.E.2d at 513, 514. 
b. A Claim of Excessive Salaries is Deriwi' 
and Belongs to the Corporation. 
Plaintiff;;' I MINI t HX^essi1 •' ^ ffv^c T =* 1,-u'it- 3, 
Proposed Amended Complaint 1| 83-87, I ' states a derivative 
claim belonging to IIC and/or Equitable Richardson v. Ariz:na 
Fuels torp I l I ' 11 h ^  w n. •* I1 I •H'' i , besseLL, et al. v. 
Bessett, 434 X . r.. 1 1 *. , - Mi.-*. 1/31 v: was clear ina: 
plaintiffs '':°rj a*""-^ci::n Lu lmp^r--r * 1 
;.. : * i_ii-::^. : ,. action. \.r^vc. , p_j&, ^ :::s '^_- A as 
basea - y ' idiculous allegation that . '^  " * wr .awsuics were 
f . : ^ C =UT3t.' - * " ' > - ' ' -
r.ainrutrj ji^^g-.j i..v t..- .:;.-absLarciaced a_egacicns ' :: a 35 
year ' Id IIAS'IV pci^v tr a ^it.r/rci nracr:nD ^f ^xcesiiv: 
a- -F r - . . ;.:;v ::c the 
corporal:ic:,, ^.tnouor p.amtiffs readily admitted cney have 
absolutely no idea what salaries either corporation current 1y 
I- . J 1 M (. > 1. L Icei s , Because this was at best a derivative claim, 
ani at worst was founded on a ridiculous assumption that 35-year 
old allegations justi fy corporate 1 i guidat i on , the r] ,-i i m \ M\ :H 1 ] 1 i 
1 1 a Jv l)^e 11 siib j ect t. o immedlate dismissal i 1 1 eave had be -: 
granted to file the Amended Complaint. 
CONCLUSION 
For each reason set forth in this brief, Judge Sawaya's 
1 \ 1 I i.ngs shrm 11 K» a f M i m^d . 
s:\pbb\2 6 91 
4^ DATED this S-7 day of February, 1993 
Z^^T 
P. Bruce Badger 
FABIAN Sc CLENDENIN, 
a Professional Corporation 
Attorneys for Appellees 
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance 
Company, Insurance Investment 
Company, R. Earl Ross, E. Roderick 
Ross 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ^ / day °f February, 
1993, I caused to be mailed, first class, postage prepaid, two 
true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellee's Brief, to: 
Lynn P. Heward 
Delwin T. Pond 
923 East 5350 South #E 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
7<~ 
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ADDENDUM 
s:\pbb\2691 
(Q( 
Jay B. Bell.. #A4"^ 
P. Bruce Badcer, * - -
FABIAN -. ..;.NJi:N41\r 
a Proi ; . ::al Corporator 
Attorneys tor Equitable Life & Casualty 
Insurance Company, " - ranee Investment 
Compan/* 7 m * ~ - Roderick 
Ross 
Twelfth r .^: 
215 South State Street 
P. 0. Box 51021C 
SaIt Lake C: t \ . J: o^ o4 . -„. 
Telephone: (80i) ^3) 830, 
- — I , "^'- "" -'XttJRT 
LEGNTINE ._;. . r: trierrc . 
StocK :r 'buraiue ^vestment Company 
a Utan Corporation, on behalf of hers-
and other similarly «Ht-uate^ Mlders 
such stock, / 
) 
Plaint ' ) 
vs. ) 
WRITABLE LIFE AND Li.-^*. - , xNSURANCL 
I'JMPANY, a Utah Corporation, INSURANCE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah Corporator 
R. EARL ROSS, E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN 
ROSS, DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS, CZS\[2 z . -. 
and Does 1 through 20 - i Q n c i c c ^ t f 
Lie i e r i d a n t s . - ^dqe Ja.Tes - . . a v a y a 
P l a i n t i f f ' s R en ew ed M o t i n i i O i MaintcnaniK* <^ » A I l a s s 
£. *r i c r. " a !T -e MI 'I t in t in i 11 i in I I I11' 111 111 ." • I 111 11, 111 II i 
' i s r e p r e s e n t e d uy hyiui r , i lewiirn i "<| T h e d e f e n d a n t s 
Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Company, Insurance Investment 
Company, R. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross were represented by P. 
Bruce Badger, Esq. The court having considered the memoranda 
filed by counsel, having heard argument and being otherwise fully 
advised in the premises, hereby enters its order consistent with 
its minute entry dated June 14, 1990, 
It is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Renewed 
Motion for Maintenance As A Class Action is denied. 
DATED this, ^ r day of June 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
James S. Savaya 
D i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATU OP U'l Art 
LEONTINE C. POND and Mnru.ii 
HYER COMPANY, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, INSURANCE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS, 
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS 
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS, 
CONNIE ROSS, and Doe* 1 t-h»-
20, 
Defendants. 
) 
( I ( ? Ill II Il I" 
C i v i l No. 890905755CV 
Judge J a m e s S . Savaya 
De#f- • " i' * ha|.. ! i1.1 i i • i .11 jutiL' | I n s u r a n c e Company, 
. r a n e e Inves tment Compaiu n Ka i i Ross and R o d e r i c k h R o s s " 
M o t i o n i oi P a r t i a l Summary J u d g m e r i f n i " n ",r i i i n " • I i> » v 
The H o n o r . i l ' l e fames i«. , ^ i iii i 1, i I'd nl
 t ll) p m 
i Iini iHiiu'V i riq d e t e r i d d n L ^ w e r e l e p i e s e n t e d b y J a y n He i i m i l i 
B r u c e B a d g e r , Hv*1 [ l a i r t i l f w a s i e p r e s e n t e d b y L v n n f'tjw i ' '"it"" 
I ' M U I I h e a r d o r a l a r q u n n i l i i" l ! j mi u J .m . n . i p e u t i v e 
memoranda i i i e n ly m UP P J I U I H S e n t e r s t h i s o r d e r c o n s i s t e n t w i t h 
t h e c o u r t ' s m i n u t e e r l ry d a t e d S e p t e m b e r 1 \ ' 990 , ,ind ^i« j it»h/ 
ORDERS! Afi fill HiF-i iiiiii nrl Hhi* I I I I I HI I III HUH I MI I I NIL I M T -
1, id J Summarj ' ' i " . s yi a n t e d , vl iJ •Minplamt as ' i " he moving 
defendants is dismissed insofar as plaintiffs1 claims and demand 
for relief rely upon a liquidation of Insurance Investment 
Company. 
DATED this day of October 1990. 
BY THE COURT: 
_^i 
James S./ Savaya 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Lynn~Heward 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
j&& >u*c&^ 
P. Bruce Badger 
Attorney for 
Equitable Life and Casi 
Insurance Company, 
Insurance Investment Company, 
R. Earl Ross and Roderick E. 
Ross 
PBB:101890B 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT TOIIRT 
SALT LAKE tI01.JP"! "
 r ""J! ["A i'K OP UTAH 
LEONTINE C. POND and MERLE G. 
HYER COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
holders of'Preferred Stock in 
Insurance Investment Company, 
a Utah Corporation, on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly 
situated holders nf - -h stock, 
v. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
Co rpo ration, INSURANCE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS, 
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS 
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS 
CONNIE ROSS, and Does n *• jgh 
20, 
Defendants, 
ORDER AND SUMMARY i *'IM¥M'1% 
:v N- " 19057 5 5CV 
—age James i niw H
 b a 
TV- A\>i ",* .Siifranai" v Judqmenr• dated September 24, 
1991 T u HO uy uerendants Equitable tit> _u.,uaiij ii^unnce 
Company { "Equi tabJ e ' l I nsurancp T aw •. i iin n I
 m 1 i, I 11 i I 
E a r l R o s s and F riviilir d w i jm*. tor h e a r i n g un Mo n d d 
,N,«.,, 1/ ,enil PI- i M I , I "J "J I, il 10 0 p.m. P l a i n t i f f s , L e o n t i n e Pond a 
M e r l e H y e r C o m p a n y w e r e r e p r e s e r t e d t ,»> , •• M I .uni 
E q u i t a b l e , I'TC n: i- i n im.v i i I H.-dei" ick N C V . WI->I-^ rpf e-
i" in iiLT; Lici.j^ ei" and Jay H ih-1 I , L ! F a b i a n & C l e n d e n 
The court heard argument of counsel and being fully advised in 
the premises and having taken the matter under advisement, enters 
the following Order and Judgment consistent with its minute entry 
dated November 21, 1991. It is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that defendants Equita-
ble, ICC, R\. Earl Ross and E. Roderick Ross's Motion for Summary 
Judgment dated September 24, 1991 is granted. All remaining 
claims in Leontine Pond's Complaint, and plaintiff, Merle Hyer 
Company's Complaint-in-Intervention, addressed to these moving 
defendants, which were not previously dismissed pursuant to an 
earlier Order of this court, dated October 24, 1990, are now dis-
missed with prejudice. 
DATED this Q\-fr4ay of December 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
James S. 'Safwaya 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING. 
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that on the J day of December 1991, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER AND SUMMARY JUDGMENT was 
mailed, first class, postage prepaid to: 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
HALT LAKE COUNTY, SI ATE OV UTAH 
I,BONTINE C. POND and MERLE G. 
HYER COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
holders of Preferred Stock in 
Insurance Investment Company, 
a Utah Corporatior;, m behalf of 
themselves and otner similarly 
situated holders of r,uch stock, 
v. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, INSURANCE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS, 
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS 
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS, 
CONNIE ROSS, and Does 1 thrci'ili 
Defendants. 
C o n s i s t e n 1 > 111 v t'l 111 i y < > 1 D e c e m r > • * -
I 11 I in I 11 ' I e b y 
ORDERED, .ADJUDGED and DECREED that applicants •-
to intervene is denied. 
DATED this X ^ ddy ui V_ > ,fi _ _ _ 1991. 
BY THE COURT: 
'M-
j aines S. ' Safcaya 
District Court J ..idqe 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
INTERVENE 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEONTINE C. POND and MERLE G. 
HYER COMPANY, a Utah corporation, 
holders of Preferred Stock in 
Insurance Investment Company, 
a Utah Corporation, on behalf of 
themselves and other similarly 
situated holders of such stock, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
EQUITABLE LIFE AND CASUALTY 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, INSURANCE 
INVESTMENT COMPANY, a Utah 
Corporation, R. EARL ROSS, 
E. RODERICK ROSS, GALEN J. ROSS 
DAVID E. ROSS II, DIANE ROSS 
WORTHEN, BETSY ROSS RAPPS, 
CONNIE ROSS, and Does 1 through 
20, 
Defendants. 
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO 
AMEND COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 890905755CV 
Judge James S. Savaya 
Consistent with the court's Minute Entry of January 14, 
1992, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED that plaintiffs' Motion 
to Amend Complaint is denied. 
DATED this^\_ day of 1992. 
BY THE COURT: 
James S.'Savaya 
District Court Judge 
